The notion of fundamental clusters is introduced, serving as a rule of thumb to characterize the statistical properties of the complex behaviour of cellular automata such as spatial 2 Â 2 games. They represent the smallest cluster size determining the fate of the entire system. Checking simple growth criteria allows us to decide whether the cluster-individuals, e.g. some mutant family, are capable of surviving and invading a resident population. In biology, spatial 2 Â 2 games have a broad spectrum of applications ranging from the evolution of cooperation and intraspecies competition to disease spread. This methodological study allows simple classi¢cations and long-term predictions in various biological and social models to be made.
INTRODUCTION
2 Â 2 games continue to receive ever increasing attention as simple models for biological, social and economic scenarios. Even though they are far too simple to capture every detail of such complex interactions, they represent a powerful tool for understanding the characteristics of such encounters. A well-known and well-studied member of these 2 Â 2 games is the Prisoner's Dilemma, which explains the emergence of cooperative behaviour among sel¢sh individuals (see, for example, Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Nowak & Sigmund, 1993; Milinski 1987; Wedekind & Milinski 1996; Fehr & Ga« chter 1999 and others) . Perhaps even better known to behavioural ecologists is another 2 Â 2 game called Chicken or the HawkD ove game, which describes intraspecies competition (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973) .
Including spatial dimensions has proven to be a very fruitful extension to evolutionary game theory (see, for example, Nowak & May 1992; Lindgren & Nordahl 1994; Herz 1994; Killingback & Doebeli 1998; Eshel et al. 1999 Eshel et al. , 1998 Hartvigsen et al. 2000) . Instead of considering a well mixed population where all individuals interact with each other, the individuals are bound to lattice sites and interact only with their neighbours. Each individual is engaged in a 2 Â 2 game with each of its neighbours. In these games, the players have two options: they must choose between the strategies C and D. The pay-o¡ matrix for the joint behaviour of the two players is then given by R T S P ,
where R denotes the pay-o¡ for both players choosing C, P for mutual D, and for C against D the former gets S and the latter T. The rank ordering of the four pay-o¡ values R, S, T and P de¢ne very di¡erent strategic situations (Posch et al. 1999) . For instance, T4R4P4S de¢nes the Prisoner's Dilemma where C denotes cooperation and D defection. In this situation, rational players will opt for defection because it pays more, regardless of the opponent's decision. Consequentially, both players end up with P points only instead of the reward R for mutual cooperation; hence the dilemma. Without loss of generality, we assume that R4P and normalize the pay-o¡ values such that R 1 and P 0 holds. In case R > P does not hold, we simply interchange C and D. Using this convention, each game is represented by a point in the S,T -plane. The di¡erent rank ordering of R, S,T and P divides the plane into 12 regions as shown in ¢gure 1; each region represents a certain type of game.
On our lattice, we consider only two kinds of players: those who always cooperate and those who always defect. An individual plays the game once with every nearest neighbour. Scenarios with repeated interactions have been studied by Nakamaru et al. (1997) ; and Brauchli et al. (1999) , for example. In each generation every individual plays with all its neighbours. At the end of a generation the score of each individual is determined by summing up its pay-o¡s against its neighbours. The scores in the neighbourhood, including the individual's own score, are ranked; in the following generation the individual adopts the strategy of the most successful player. In the case of a tie between the scores of C-and D-type players, the individual keeps its original strategy.
In biology, the score of an individual is interpreted in terms of reproductive success. For the above update rule, only the most successful strategy is able to reproduce by taking over neighbouring sites. An equally valid interpretation in social or economic contexts refers to individuals watching their neighbourhood and adapting the strategy of the most successful neighbour.
Even in this simple and completely deterministic situation, where individuals have no means to develop complex strategies, lattice dynamics turns out to be complex (see, for example, Killingback & Doebeli 1998 ), leading to intriguing dynamic patterns. Recent developments and some extensions are given in Nowak & Sigmund (2000) .
The following investigations are aimed at determining the minimal requirements for a strategy to survive and invade a world of opponents. These requirements are a combination of suitable pairs of S,T -values together with a minimal cluster size. The study of such minimal clusters in spatial games was initiated by Killingback et al. (1999) . We continue this work and extend it to 2 Â 2 games in general.
GROWING CLUSTERS
Before studying the dynamic properties of certain cluster types, we must de¢ne the neighbourhood of an individual, i.e. its competitors. Because such games on grids are actually cellular automata, we consider the two minimal and commonly used neighbourhood types for cellular automata: the Von Neumann and the Moore neighbourhoods. The former consists of the four nearest neighbours, while the latter includes interactions with the eight nearest neighbours. For a good introduction to the pioneering work of Von Neumann and games in general see Sigmund (1995) .
The dynamic behaviour of the cellular automata under consideration is very complex, e.g. the subsequent state of one site depends not only on its neighbourhood but also on the neighbours of its neighbours. With the Moore neighbourhood, this adds up to 25 cells involved and thus to 2 25 transition rules. For this reason we are interested in simple rules of thumb to determine the long-term statistical behaviour of the system. We therefore introduce the notion of fundamental clusters. They must satisfy the following conditions: ¢rst, if certain growth criteria are met (see ½½ (a) and (b) below), expansion must continue inde¢nitely and guarantee the survival of the strategy. Second, no smaller cluster is able to ful¢l the ¢rst condition. The role of such clusters, and 3 Â 3 clusters in particular, in determining the long-term dynamic behaviour of spatial games was ¢rst pointed out by Killingback et al. (1999) .
Note that the size and shape of fundamental clusters generally depends on the values of S and T. However, to obtain simple rules of thumb, we limit our investigations to clusters of cooperators of square shape. On rectangular lattices, they have the smallest perimeter-to-area ratio. This minimizes the line of interference with the surroundings, and therefore represents the most favourable situation for cluster individuals in a hostile environment, i.e. surrounded by defectors. Thus, if square clusters are unable to grow in this situation, then no other cluster shape will be formed.
In the following, we derive the conditions imposed on S and T such that 3 Â 3 clusters grow along the edges and/or the corners while parrying attacks by opponents. Then we investigate for 2 Â 2 games in general whether expansion and invasion continue inde¢nitely, given that the growth criteria are satis¢ed for 3 Â 3 clusters, i.e. if 3 Â 3 clusters are fundamental or at least a good approximation.
(a) The Von Neumann neighbourhood
The Von Neumann neighbourhood consists of the four nearest neighbours: on the left, right, above and below. In the following, we derive inequality relations for S and T such that 1 Â 1, 2 Â 2 and 3 Â 3 clusters grow. For that purpose, we determine and compare the achieved scores of a player and its neighbours. We derive su¤cient conditions that the player sticks to its strategy (persistence) and also neighbours switch to the player's strategy (expansion). The small ¢gures to the right of the equations indicate the type of interaction considered.
(ii) 2 Â 2 clusters grow if 2 2S4T (persistence) 2 2S40. 
The di¡erent regions in the S,T -plane resulting from the above equations are shown in ¢gure 2a. Comparisons of the above equations yield the following results:
(i) Growth conditions for 2 Â 2 clusters and corners of 3 Â 3 clusters are identical (cf. equations (3) and (5)).
(ii) If corners of 3 Â 3 clusters grow, edges persist and vice versa (cf. equations (5), (6) and equations (4), (7), respectively). (iii) Inequalities involving the central site occur only in the second line of equation (6). Note that this condition can be dropped because the ¢rst part is always satis¢ed if corners can grow. (iv) In contrast to the Moore neighbourhood (see equations (16)^ (18)), neither corners nor edges growing in one direction become defeated by defectors attacking from another side. As a next step, we investigate the fate of a single 3 Â 3 cluster evolved over several generations as a function of S and T. This is done by systematically sampling the S,Tplane and calculating the fraction of cooperators f t c after a speci¢ed number of generations t. The result is displayed in ¢gure 2b.
Comparisons of the growth criteria and the expansion properties in ¢gure 2a,b determine whether 3 Â 3 clusters are fundamental. The short answer is`no'. In a more detailed view, consider the following: for a considerable area in the S,T -plane, the growth criteria are met, i.e. edges grow and thus corners persist. Nevertheless, the cluster dies out after few generations. In ¢gure 2a this area is marked with a cross.
According to the results derived above, it is straightforward to check whether 2 Â 2 clusters could meet the criteria for fundamental clusters. This time the answer is almost'. With the exception of a small area with 2 < T < 4 and close to the boundary delimited by equation (3), we could not ¢nd any further areas where 2 Â 2 clusters vanish. Near this boundary, a large number of dynamic domains can be identi¢ed. They range from isolated C patches and simple growing C clusters to connected C networks and dynamic fractals. Note that for T44, growth criteria for 1 Â 1 clusters are weaker than for 2 Â 2 clusters (see ¢gure 2a). In conclusion, if the growth criteria for 2 Â 2 clusters hold, the chances are good that the strategy is able to invade a world of opponents and will survive forever.
(b) The Moore neighbourhood
The Moore neighbourhood consists of the eight nearest neighbours including all neighbours reachable by a chess-kings move. In analogy to the Von Neumann neighbourhood we derive similar but (because of the larger neighbourhood) slightly more complicated inequality relationships. As before, the small ¢gures to the right of the equations indicate the type of interaction considered.
(
(ii) 2 Â 2 clusters persist if 3 5S42T 3 5S4T.
(iii) 2 Â 2 clusters grow if 3 5S42T 3 5S40. 
(b) Edges persist if 3 5S43T 3 5S40,
(c) Corners grow in the indicated directions if 3 5S43T 3 5S40,
and either 5 3S43T, ( 1 7 ) or 843T.
( 1 8 )
Equations (8) (16)) requires special attention. Even though the corner may grow successfully, further conditions must hold to guarantee that the corner itself persists. For certain values of S and T, the corner can be successfully attacked by the defector in the middle of the edge. In that case, the persistence of the edge must be guaranteed by either the central site (equation (18)) or the cooperator on the edge (equation (17)). (iv) The role of the central site is of minor importance.
Only in the tiny parameter region marked with a cross in ¢gure 3a, where equation (16) holds but equation (17) does not, does the central site protect corners and edges against attacks. (v) Similar to the Von Neumann neighbourhood, corners of a 3 Â 3 cluster persist if edges grow and vice versa (cf. equations (11)^ (18)) with the aforementioned exception.
To complete the picture, we determine the fate of a single 3 Â 3 cluster evolved over several generations. (17) and (18). (iii) Even though we did not ¢nd regions where cooperators systematically vanished, we did ¢nd interesting con¢gurations where cooperation dies out after several generations. Figure 4 shows an example of two colliding 3 Â 3 clusters annihilating in a whirllike pattern. On arbitrary but ¢nite sized grids, cooperators may die out after some time. Interestingly, this was mainly observed for highly symmetrical con¢gurations. For example, a single 3 Â 3 cluster on a 49 Â 49 grid dies out after 444 generations (e.g. S 0:05, T 1:65).
To conclude, the growth capability of 3 Â 3 clusters generally guarantees in¢nite expansion and survival of a strategy on in¢nite grids. However, note that the reverse does not necessarily hold. As mentioned earlier, the diagonal growth of corners requires careful treatment. Although the above restrictions for 3 Â 3 clusters are rather weak and rarely apply, they should be kept in mind, particularly when dealing with smaller grid sizes. Also note that the expansion criteria for 2 Â 3 and 3 Â 3 clusters are identical with the exception of the tiny region marked with a cross. Thus, it usually su¤ces to verify the growth conditions for 2 Â 3 clusters. Therefore, both, 2 Â 3 and 3 Â 3 clusters serve as powerful approximations to fundamental clusters.
CLUSTER DYNAMICS
A closer look at the deterministic expansion of a single 3 Â 3 cluster for Von Neumann and Moore neighbourhoods (¢gures 2a and 3a) reveals that growth is far less e¤cient for the former. The smaller Von Neumann neighbourhood reduces the speed of expansion and leads to intermediate values for f t c (indicated by the grey colouring) even for most favourable S,T -values (lower right corner). Many of the boundaries separating regions of di¡erent growth are readily identi¢ed as inequality relations introduced above. Each boundary speci¢es a particular type of encounter between cooperators and defectors. The side of higher S-and lower T-values favours cooperators, while on the other side defectors are better o¡. On the boundary itself, it is a draw and the players stick to their strategy. The most interesting parameter values are found along the transition region from dominating defection to prevailing cooperation. S,T-values from this region lead to fascinating dynamic patterns, often resembling an evolutionary kaleidoscope (Nowak & May, 1993) .
To discuss the above results in a more general context and to test their relevance in more realistic scenarios, we consider randomly initialized grids with a certain fraction of cooperators f Figure 4 . The Moore neighbourhood: two particularly arranged 3 Â 3 clusters collide and annihilate producing a beautiful but fatal whirl-like pattern over ten generations (S 0:05, T 1:65). Black sites indicate defectors and white cooperators. Dark grey speci¢es cooperators that switched to defection in this generation and similarly, light grey denotes defectors that switched to cooperation. The two latter shades of grey are useful for estimating the activity in the system. Top row from left to right t 0 À 5; bottom row from left to right t 6 À 11.
For most S, T pairs the random initial con¢gurations evolve towards static patterns with an overwhelming majority of one strategy together with patchy distributions of small clusters of the other strategy. In stark contrast to these rather uninteresting domains, fascinating dynamic patterns emerge for parameters within the transition region between cooperation and defection. The dynamic equilibrium between the two strategies generates a variety of dynamic patterns, such as waves of cooperators travelling across the grid or small growing clusters of cooperators splitting periodically. In addition, similar to Conway's Game of Life (Berlekamp et al. 1982) , special structures such as blinkers, gliders and rotators are observed. Generally, the dynamic coexistence of cooperators and defectors appears to be stable with the exception of smaller grid sizes (as noted above). Note that for S,T values within the transition region, no part of the grid ever becomes static and frozen. Every now and then the strategy of every player gets challenged and possibly changes. In agreement with our results, the di¡erent dynamic domains have already been discussed by Nowak & May (1992 in the limit S 3 0, focusing on the coexistence of C and D players. This limit separates the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Chicken Game. In the S,T -plane, di¡erent domains leading to speci¢c dynamics can be identi¢ed. Interestingly, for both neighbourhood types, some small domains cross the boundary S 0. Consequentially, within these parameter domains, the spatial dynamics of the two games are identical, even though they describe two rather di¡erent biological or social scenarios.
In the remaining text we derive quantitative measures for the dynamic properties of cluster expansion in a particularly interesting area where C and D players coexist in dynamic equilibrium. For the Von Neumann neighbourhood we focus on an area roughly delimited by the conditions that C corners (see equation (3)) and D peaks (D surrounded by three C) grow (3T43 S, 3T44). Similarly, for the Moore neighbourhood the area under consideration is roughly bounded by the conditions that C edges (see equation (15)) and D corners grow (5T45 3S, 3T48). In the lower right part of both areas chaos reigns, indicated by Liapunov exponents l d 40. Details on the de¢nition and calculation of l d are relegated to Appendix A. Figures 7a and b display l d as a function of S,T for the appropriate area of the S,T -plane.
To draw a crude picture of the rich dynamics of these systems, we outline the characteristics for some constant T (Von Neumann: T % 1:5; Moore: T % 1:7) and increasing S: for small S, near the left boundary of the displayed areas, cooperators quickly vanish resulting in static con¢gurations with an overwhelming majority of defectors. These rather uninteresting states are characterized by l d < 0. Increasing S eventually allows C clusters to grow and to build C networks for the Von Neumann neighbourhood with l d % 0. Once we cross a crucial boundary (Von Neumann: 2T53 S; Moore: 3T55 3S) the dynamics change completely. Here we observe dynamic equilibrium producing intriguing patterns such as waves of cooperators travelling across the grid, but we also ¢nd structures such as growers, gliders, rotators and blinkers. In this area, the system displays chaotic dynamics with l d > 0. Further increases in S enable clusters of decreasing size to grow while increasing l d . The peak of l d (Von Neumann: l d % 0:75; Moore: l d % 0:85) lies shortly after the boundary where 1 Â 1 clusters may additionally grow. For still larger S, the travelling waves eventually decay into many tiny static areas, mostly consisting of a single site, surrounded by players constantly changing their strategy. At this stage (not shown in the ¢gures), the system has returned to a state with l d < 0. Instead of taking the maximal Liapunov exponent, we could draw a very similar picture by considering other quantities such as the power spectrum and the autocorrelation. In accordance with chaotic dynamics, the former becomes continuous and the latter approximately constant with a peak around zero.
In spatially extended systems, the timing of the grid updates is usually of crucial importance. For a detailed discussion of synchronized versus sequential updating we refer to Hubermann & Glance (1993) and Nowak et al (1994a,b) . In this paper we restrict our attention to synchronized grid updates. However, preliminary simulations have shown that the phase diagrams of the S,T-plane are hardly a¡ected by the di¡erent update rules. Generally, the boundaries are slightly shifted in favour of defectors, and in some regions, where only small fractions of cooperators were able to survive, they vanish completely.
CONCLUSIONS
Fundamental clusters play an important role in spatially extended systems. They allow us to predict certain features of the long-term behaviour simply by checking the growth criteria of such clusters. If they are met, the clusterindividuals are able to survive and successfully invade a world of opponents. Usually such cluster-individuals are considered to be some sort of mutant family attempting to invade a resident population. For instance, for the Prisoner's Dilemma we deduce from ¢gures 5 and 6 that, regardless of the neighbourhood type, cooperative behaviour spreads only for large S and small T, i.e. S 3 0, T 3 1. For a small range of S,T -values cooperators and defectors coexist, but generally clusters of cooperators are without hope and vanish quickly.
For minimal neighbourhood types, such as the Von Neumann and Moore neighbourhoods, 3 Â 3 clusters are intuitive candidates to serve as fundamental clusters. For the Von Neumann neighbourhood 3 Â 3 clusters are not fundamental. For a considerable range of the parameter space S, T 3 Â 3 clusters grow in the ¢rst generation, satisfying the growth criteria, but then they quickly vanish. However, the smaller 2 Â 2 clusters turn out to be almost fundamental. With the exception of a tiny region in the S,T -plane we could not ¢nd further regions where 2 Â 2 clusters vanish. Thus, the growth criteria for 2 Â 2 clusters are reliable indicators regarding the long-term fate of the cluster individuals.
For the Moore neighbourhood, the growth of 3 Â 3 clusters indeed guarantees in¢nite expansion with certain weak restrictions. We did not ¢nd areas in the S,T -plane where 3 Â 3 clusters systematically vanished while satisfying the growth criteria. However, we found interesting con¢gurations that did vanish. For example, two colliding 3 Â 3 clusters may annihilate or, on smaller grids with periodic boundary conditions, highly symmetrical con¢gurations suddenly disappear. Moreover, along one boundary of a tiny region (marked with a cross in ¢gure 3a) growth is limited to a small area around 3 Â 3 clusters and hence violates conditions for fundamental clusters. With the exception of this tiny region, 2 Â 3 clusters satisfy identical growth criteria. Thus, for the Moore neighbourhood 2 Â3 and 3 Â 3 clusters both serve as powerful approximations to fundamental clusters allowing for reliable predictions.
For stochastical initialization of the grid with a certain fraction of cooperators f 0 c , we show that for considerable regions of the S, T plane the average fraction of cooperators f c sensitively depends on f 0 c . Mostly in areas where 3 Â 3 or smaller clusters of neither C nor D players grow (low S and low T), the initial majority dominates and further diminishes the minority. In general, however, di¡erences to results for a single cluster are surprisingly small. It appears that the growing clusters level out most of the initial di¡erences.
Finally, we introduced a simple measure l d , by analogy to Liapunov exponents, to characterize dynamic properties of ¢nite systems discrete in time and space. This indicates that chaotic dynamics (l d 40) are responsible for the fascinating patterns generated in the small region of the S,T -plane where C and D players coexist in dynamic equilibrium.
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In this Appendix we derive an analogous quantity l d for systems discrete in time and space. Because l d allows for very similar classi¢cations of the systems dynamics, we refer to it as a Liapunov exponent.
Consider an n Â m grid, on which a speci¢ed fraction of cooperators f 0 c is randomly distributed. Let the system relax by evolving it over at least max(n, m)/2 generations. This corresponds to the minimal time it takes to spread information across the entire grid. In a next step, the relaxed state is duplicated and in one copy the strategy of e ( n Á m randomly chosen players is changed from C to D and vice versa. The Hamming distance d t is used to determine the di¡erence of the two copies. It indicates the number of sites occupied by unequal strategies at time t. Thus, the initial distance of the two copies is d t 4e. l d is derived from the time evolution of d t when evolving the two copies in parallel:
For the systems under consideration, two problems arise from equation (20): ¢rst, d t cannot become arbitrarily large due to the ¢nite size of the grid. This puts an upper limit to the meaningful number of updates N and consequentially the accuracy of l d . Second, for e41 disturbances initiated by the di¡erent seeds expand independently and interfere in an unpredictable manner. This puts further restrictions on N. Also note that e41 must hold to allow for negative values of l d .
Problems arising from numerical over£ow are usually solved by periodically rescaling d t while preserving its direction in multidimensional systems. For cellular automata such rescaling is impossible because of the binary character of the system. For this reason, we repeat the above procedure and take the average to obtain l d . Averaging over di¡erent initial disturbances is important because often the time evolution of d t sensitively depends on the immediate neighbourhood of the £ipped sites.
An important restriction of the outlined procedure concerns parameter ranges with l d close to zero with static con¢gurations of the grid. In those regions, small disturbances often lead to short bursts of activity with d t quickly approaching a constant value. By inspection it is readily seen that l d 3 0, but the numerical procedure typically returns positive values. However, the unreliable results are revealed by a signi¢cantly higher standard deviation.
